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DO FINANCIAL EXPERTS ON THE BOARD MATTER? AN EMPIRICAL TEST FROM 
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NON-LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Recent corporate governance research finds little consistent evidence that the 
financial expertise of directors impacts positively on corporate results no matter how 
performance is measured. Such ambiguity could reflect the broad definition of financial 
expertise and a lack of comparability of outcome measures across widely diverse firms. In 
the present study, we use longitudinal data (1999 to 2012) on a set of closely related firms 
drawn from the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life (property-casualty) insurance industry. We 
conduct specific empirical tests of the effect of three specific categories of financial 
expertise - professionally qualified accountants, actuaries, and insurance underwriters1,2 - 
on six often used ratio-based measures of insurance company performance, namely, the net 
profit margin (MARGIN), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), solvency/leverage 
(SOL), loss ratio (LR), and the combined  ratio (COR).3  
 
                                                          
1 We define professionally qualified accountants as members of the UK’s Consultative Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies (CCAB) or their overseas equivalent (e.g., the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants); professionally qualified actuaries are taken as members of the UK’s Institute/Faculty of 
Actuaries or overseas equivalent (e.g., the US Society of Actuaries); and professional insurance underwriters  
are defined as members of the UK’s Chartered Insurance Institute or overseas equivalent (e.g., the US 
Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters). All members of such professional bodies are qualified by 
examination and experience, and subject to continuing professional development (CPD) requirements. Our 
definition of financial expert is thus more precise than that used in prior US research. For example, Hoitash, 
Hoitash and Bedard (2009) follow the US Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) and so adopt a broad definition of 
financial expert that includes board members that hold/have held senior executive positions (e.g., Chief 
Operating Officers) and/or individuals who may have a 'financial label' but no formal financial qualifications. 
Other board-level financial experts (e.g., Chartered Financial Analysts), accounting and finance academics, and 
individuals who were multi-professionally qualified were not observed from our sample of non-life insurance 
firms. Furthermore, as insurers receive premiums (funds) in advance of the payment of claims, secured bank 
finance tends not to be used by insurance firms thereby reducing the need for insurers to appoint bankers to 
their boards. Where debt is used by insurers it is subordinate to the fixed claims of policyholders and normally 
subject to prior approval by the insurance industry regulator. 
 
2 We do not dispute that non-professionally qualified directors (e.g., individuals with acquired firm and/or 
insurance industry experience) can contribute to improving financial performance. However, we take the view 
that professional finance status confers on the holder a higher degree of public credibility and technical 
competence compared with those that are not professionally qualified. These qualities are especially 
important in highly complex and tightly regulated sectors such as financial services (e.g., see Kim, Maudlin and 
Patro, 2014). Additionally, the ethical standards and monitoring of professional bodies helps mitigate the risk 
of conflicts of interest such as those that might arise from bankers influencing board members to take out 
expensive loans to finance negative net present value (NPV) projects. As a result, unlike scholars such as 
Günar, Malmendier and Tate (2008), our study conveniently avoids the potentially confounding effects of such 
biases on corporate performance.   
 
3 While the first three measures apply to firms in general, the last three measures reflect dimensions of the 
financial strength and condition of non-life, insurance firms. 
2 
 
 Insurance is essentially a financial contracting mechanism designed to indemnify 
policyholders for future losses in return for regular premiums. By its nature, therefore, 
insurance transactions create explicit contingent liabilities for insurers at the point-of-sale. 
This contractual obligation necessitates that insurance firms charge 'actuarially fair' rates of 
premium and that they are actively managed as commercial ‘going concerns’ (Boubakri, 
Dionne and Triki, 2008). Froot and O'Connell (2008) also report that the selection and 
actuarial pricing of risks is inherently difficult in the non-life sector of the insurance market 
due to their heterogeneous and unpredictable nature. Such complexities in estimating, and 
hence accounting for, risks and associated future losses require a high degree of accounting 
and actuarial expertise in order to minimize loss reserving errors and avoid the potential 
share price implications of reporting restatements (Anthony and Petroni, 1997).  Therefore, 
compared with many other parts of the financial services sector, the risk management 
decisions of the boards of non-life insurance firms are likely to be particularly reliant on 
sound professional financial judgements that involve a combination of acquired technical 
knowledge and training as well as risk management experience (Adams and Jiang, 2016, 
2017).  
Adams and Jiang (2016, 2017) further note that board-level strategic decisions of 
non-life insurance business are further complicated by industry-specific regulations, external 
capital maintenance rules, and statutory solvency monitoring requirements - aspects of the 
insurance business that again require decision-making input from financial professionals. 
Compliance with these commercial, regulatory, and public policy requirements as well as 
the intrinsically technical and idiosyncratic nature of insurance thus means that the 
insurance industry, more than most other industrial sectors, has to effectively utilize the 
expertise of financial specialists, notably accountants, actuaries, and underwriters, at the 
board-level. Indeed, the importance of financial and risk management expertise on the 
boards of UK insurers is reflected in both financial regulation and legislation (e.g., the 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA), 2000) as well as national corporate governance 
codes (e.g., the Cadbury Report, 1992) (Dewing and Russell, 2004)4. 
                                                          
4 Note that the 'approved persons' regime of the UK's FSMA (2000, section 59(1-7)) and supporting insurance 
regulations do not mandate that board members of insurance firms need to have formally recognized 
professional (e.g., accountancy or actuarial) qualifications as a condition of their appointment. However, the 
implication is that professional status would help determine whether a prospective board member of an 
insurance firm is likely to be viewed by the insurance industry regulator to be a 'fit and proper' person under 
the terms of the FSMA (2000). The UK insurance regulator during the period of our analysis (1999 to 2012) was 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
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Of our financial period indicators, net profit margin, return on assets and return on 
equity are profit-based measures of performance, leverage is a solvency-based measure of 
financial condition, and the loss ratio and combined ratio capture underwriting 
performance. We find that collectively, financial experts have a beneficial influence on the 
performance outcomes of insurers. Board-level qualified accountants and actuaries are 
linked with superior performance in all six of our selected financial outcome measures. 
Professional insurance underwriters are associated with sound solvency levels (low 
leverage) and underwriting results, but not with positive earnings-based measures. This 
suggests that a focus on solvency may be an important objective for insurance firms as 
much as profitability.  
 Our study contributes to the literature on the relation between board member 
characteristics and the financial effectiveness of corporate governance in at least three 
regards. First, evidence that board-level financial expertise either collectively, and/or in 
terms of speciality, matters in terms of financial performance could help shape future 
corporate governance guidelines and practices, especially as they relate to the insurance 
sector. Second, by focusing on the UK’s non-life insurance industry where finance skills and 
expertise are integral to business activities (e.g., risk selection, policy design and product 
pricing), our study further avoids lack of statistical power that arises from cross-
country/cross-industry analysis (e.g., see Nissim, 2013). Third, our selection of firms of 
different size, ownership-type, and governance structures drawn from the UK insurance 
industry with its explicit stakeholder interest further enables us to benefit from increased 
within sample variation and mitigate potential selection bias that can arise in studies using 
data drawn from predominantly shareholder-focused publicly traded firms.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. We first provide background 
information on the UK’s non-life insurance industry and then develop our hypotheses. The 
next section outlines the research design, including the description of the data, modelling 
procedure, and definition of the variables used. We then analyse and discuss the empirical 
results, while the final section concludes our study. 
2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 The UK’s non-life insurance company market comprises approximately 300 or so 
active domestically-owned and foreign-owned companies, subsidiaries and branches of 
varying size, ownership structure, and product-mix, which currently generates 
approximately £50 billion (US$61 billion) in gross annual premiums (International 
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Underwriting Association, 2013)5. In addition, 94 active syndicates at the Lloyd's of London 
insurance market currently underwrite direct non-life premiums of roughly £25.3 billion 
(US$31 billion) per annum, mainly in property and casualty insurance (Lloyd's of London, 
2014). Securing ‘value added’ (e.g., through sustained profitability) and solvency 
maintenance (e.g., via reinsurance) are key strategic goals for the boards of insurance 
companies (Adiel, 1996). These objectives serve not only internal constituents such as 
managers, policyholders and investors, but also external stakeholders, including regulators, 
policymakers, and credit ratings agencies. However, achieving strategic financial goals in 
insurance firms depends on the effective use of board-level financial expertise (Hardwick, 
Adams and Zou, 2011).  Regulatory and structural market changes as well as high profile 
accounting scandals over the last two decades or so have further heightened the increasing 
need for financial expertise on the boards of firms, especially in the financial services sector 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005)6.  
 We consider that the UK's non-life insurance industry is a good institutional 
environment within which to frame our research. Unlike the US's SOX Act (2002, section 
407), there is no legal requirement in the UK or most European Union (EU) countries for 
financial experts to be represented on the board (e.g., as members of audit committees). 
Insurance industry regulations in the US also mandate that the annual audit of non-life 
insurance claims reserves (a major discretionary balance sheet item) should be carried out 
by a professionally qualified actuary, whereas in the UK this practice, whilst common place, 
is not statutorily prescribed. These legal and regulatory differences between the US and UK 
could influence board composition in subtly different ways. For example, the traditionally 
more prescriptive approach in the US could direct non-life insurers there to appoint (more) 
actuaries to the board (e.g., to facilitate professional dialogue with auditors). In contrast, 
the number, and type of board-level financial experts in the UK's non-life insurance industry, 
like other parts of the country's financial services sector, is more of a discretionary firm-level 
decision that is based on the potential performance impact rather than one directed by 
                                                          
5 In 2012/13 there were 976 non-life insurance entities licensed to operate in the UK but only about a third of 
these entities actively underwrite insurance business. Non-active insurance operatives include a miscellany of 
structures such as closed funds in run-off, 'brass plate' branches of overseas firms, and protection and 
indemnity pools that do not underwrite third party risks. 
 
6 The international insurance industry has not escaped high profile corporate governance failures in recent 
years - witness the 2001 demise of the UK's Independent Insurance Group plc and the US$182 billion bailout of 
the American International Group (AIG) by the US Federal government in 2008. 
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external rules and regulations (Adams and Jiang, 2016)7. Kaplan and Minton (2012) further 
note that in the US corporate sector the statutory strictures of SOX (2002) have increased 
boardroom turnover and changes in strategic direction with potentially adverse effects on 
financial performance. In contrast, firms operating in the UK's corporate sector, including 
the insurance industry, have not been subject to the performance-effects of major changes 
in board composition. The UK's less prescriptive environment thus enables us to potentially 
conduct a more direct test of our hypotheses. What is more, from 2004/5 UK insurers unlike 
their counterparts in the US were subject to IFRS 4: Insurance Contracts (International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 2004). IFRS 4 represented a clear-cut regulatory 
development that affected the accounting and public disclosure practices of UK insurers, 
and possibly their board structure8. The issuance of IFRS 4 thus represents a good 
opportunity to examine the effects of an exogenous event on the composition of board-
level financial expertise and corporate performance. 
3  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPEMENT 
Board-Level Financial Expertise 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the board of directors has ultimate responsibility 
for the economic, efficient and effective allocation and use of corporate resources. As such, 
the board is at the apex of the system of governance in the modern corporation. In 
maximizing value for shareholders, Adams and Ferreira (2007) report that the board 
provides two key functions: first, the monitoring and control of principal-agent incentive 
conflicts; and second, providing advice to the CEO and other board-level directors on how to 
maximize firm value. Custódio and Metzger (2014) argue more specifically that as financial 
sophisticates, senior finance-expert directors are able to communicate more effectively with 
capital markets than their non-financial counterparts. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and 
Güner et al. (2008), however, suggest that the appointment of board-level financial experts 
(in their cases, bankers) could produce misaligned incentives and reduce firm value. 
However, we expect such agency incentive conflicts to be less severe in the insurance 
                                                          
7 In the UK's insurance sector, the level of discretion is to some extent constrained by the regulatory vetting 
and approval of nominated board appointments (Dewing and Russell, 2008). However, the extent to which the 
UK Insurance industry regulator fails to ratify nominated directors and the reasons for such decisions are not 
publicly available. Regulatory/legal actions are only reported in the public domain following serious events 
such as the corporate demise and fraudulent activity in 2001 of the UK non-life insurer Independent Insurance 
plc. 
 
8 In contrast to mandatory regulations such as IFRS 4, the introduction of voluntary corporate governance 
codes of conduct, such as the UK's Cadbury Report (1992) leads to staggered rather than immediate rates of 
adoption over time (Dahya and McConnell, 2007). 
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industry than in other parts of the corporate sector. Moreover, as a consequence of 
corporate governance guidelines desire to minimize overly risky decision-making (e.g., see 
the Higgs Report (2003)), outside directors in the UK are rarely compensated by 
performance-related contracts, such as stock options. For these reasons, the possibilities for 
board members, including professionally qualified financial experts, to extract 'economic 
rents' and engage in 'risk-shifting' activities at the expense of other stakeholders are likely to 
be less acute in the UK insurance industry. Raheja (2005) further notes that in complex firms 
(such as insurers), board-level financial experts help reduce the verification costs of 
corporate financial information thereby promoting the efficiency and reliability of the 
external audit function9. Therefore, through the lens of agency theory the supervisory and 
advisory functions of professionally qualified financial experts on the board serve the 
interests of capital providers – for example, through improved stewardship and the 
alleviation of market information asymmetries.  
Financial Experts in Insurance  
In developed countries such as the UK and US, financial experts, particularly 
professionally qualified accountants, are all-pervasive on the boards of companies across all 
industrial sectors including financial services (Defond, Han and Hu, 2005; Güner et al., 2008; 
Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao, 2011). Edwards, Anderson and Chandler (2007) 
attribute the functional prevalence of accountants in corporate governance not just to their 
professional education and training but also to their historical prominence in the 
development of the modern firm and associated business legislation and regulation since at 
least the mid-nineteenth century. According to Edwards et al. (2007), other professional 
groups, such as actuaries, also emerged in the UK around the mid-nineteenth century.10 
Hardwick et al. (2011) note that professionally qualified actuaries perform important board-
level governance functions in insurance firms across a range of financial activities, including 
pricing, liability reserving, asset management, and promoting the efficient allocation and 
                                                          
9 Approximately 90% of the non-life insurance firms in our panel data set were audited by one of the Big-4 
international (brand-name) audit firms - Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG or PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC). The use of 'brand-name' auditors is a common feature in developed insurance markets such as the UK 
and US and reflects the technically complex nature of insurance and plurality of constituents (e.g., investors, 
policyholders, and industry regulators) that insurance company financial reporting has to satisfy (Gaver and 
Paterson, 2001). However, the lack of firm-level and temporal variation in insurers' choice of audit firm 
precludes us from investigating auditor-effects in the corporate governance-performance relation. 
 
10 The UK accounting profession dates from 1854 with the foundation of the institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) and 1880 with the creation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW). The Institute of Actuaries was founded in England in 1848 and its counterpart - 
the Scottish Faculty - was established in 1856. 
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use of resources. Scordis (2011) adds that in recent years accounting has become 
increasingly important for the international insurance industry given the advent of new 
accounting rules (e.g., the introduction of IFRS 4) and solvency regulations (e.g., the EU's 
2016 Solvency II capital maintenance standards). The 2007/8 global financial crisis has also 
raised the profile of corporate accounting, particularly in the financial services sector (e.g., 
see Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011). Serafeim (2011) argues that such institutional 
changes have resulted in a closer fusion of accounting and actuarial systems in insurance 
firms - a trend the highlights the need for board-level financial expertise in insurance firms.  
The greater unpredictability of the risk exposures in non-life insurance (Froot and 
O’Connell, 2008) also heightens the functional role of the professional underwriter in 
selecting and pricing of risks, and setting coverage levels and deductibles. Such functions are 
critical to ensuring the future financial strength and condition of non-life insurance firms 
(Browne and Kamiya, 2012). This implies that professional underwriting expertise at the 
board-level is likely to be of strategic importance for non-life insurance firms11. 
To sum up, financial experts on the boards of non-life insurance firms provide 
specialist advice and supervisory control that protects and promotes the economic interests 
of policyholders, shareholders, and other contracting constituents. In fact, recent corporate 
governance research (e.g., Faleye et al., 2011) suggests that technically complex firms (such 
as insurers) have particular need for the collective ‘intense’ monitoring and ‘deep’ advice 
from strategically-minded board-level financial experts. Moreover, as in Hardwick et al. 
(2011), we reason that in the technically complex insurance industry, the higher the 
proportion of board-level financial experts the relatively less severe the information 
problem, and therefore the better strategic decision-making is likely to be, all else equal.  
This implies that financial experts can assist the functional responsibilities of each other as 
well as the complement the skill sets of other directors thereby contributing to superior firm 
performance. Therefore: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the proportion of board-level financial experts is likely to be 
positively related to earnings-related indicators, superior solvency, and profitable 
underwriting. 
 
Performance by Type of Financial Expert   
The professional training of accountants stresses the analysis and reporting of 
financial information that is of primary interest to creditors, shareholders and prospective 
                                                          
11 The UK’s professional insurance underwriting body - the Chartered Insurance Institute - was established in 
1912 from a consolidation of several London-based and provincial underwriting associations. 
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investors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This implies that the realization of accounting 
earnings-based measures of performance, such as the net profit margin, return on assets, 
and return on equity are likely to be emphasized when professionally qualified accountants 
predominate on the board. This is particularly the case as such indicators are important in 
the valuation of insurance firms (Nissim, 2013). Custódio and Metzger (2014) add that  
accountants, are likely to be more exposed to professional principles that espouse the 
primacy of earnings-related measures of performance and the maintenance of the firm as a 
'going concern'. Accountants on the board can also have beneficial impacts on the solvency 
and underwriting functions of non-life insurers  - for example, by ensuring that actuaries and 
underwriters have reliable and relevant financial information (e.g., on loss experiences) and 
that they comply with budgetary targets on period costs and profits. Consequently: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the proportion of board-level accountants is likely to be 
positively related to earnings-related indicators, superior solvency, and profitable 
underwriting performance. 
 
The traditional focus of the professional actuary emphasizes the custodianship of 
policyholders’ fixed claims and corporate solvency - goals that are shared with insurance 
industry regulators and other stakeholders, such as reinsurers and credit ratings agencies 
(Sherris, 1987). The ability of insurers to meet statutory levels of solvency is also likely to be 
a top priority for insurance industry regulators (Adiel, 1996). Therefore, like their 
professional accountancy colleagues, we expect board-level actuaries to stress the 
importance of solvency-based measures of performance such as low leverage. Additionally, 
in fulfilling their stewardship function board-level actuaries can also directly influence profit-
based measures of financial performance - for example, in order to increase reserves, lower 
future costs of capital and/or meet policyholders' financial expectations, including future 
solvency maintenance and the settlement of claims. Through their design and risk pricing of 
insurance products actuaries can also directly influence underwriting results (Kunreuther, 
1989). The financial and risk management board role of actuaries in the UK insurance 
market has also been given added impetus by the UK FSMA (2000) and the 'realistic 
reporting' regime advocated by the FSA's (2004) prudential standards. Therefore:   
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the proportion of board-level actuaries is likely to be positively 
related to earnings-related indicators, superior solvency, and profitable underwriting 
performance. 
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Insurance underwriters measure and evaluate operational performance in terms of 
annual premiums earned in relation to incurred annual claims and operating expenditures. 
Kunreuther (1989) adds that underwriters employ actuarial estimates on the probability and 
magnitude of losses together with experiential (qualitative) assessments of risk to ensure 
the financial viability of an insurance firm. Eckles, Hoyt and Miller (2014) note that in the 
insurance industry underwriting risks are often assessed and managed in a segmental rather 
than holistic manner. This could make insurance underwriters focus primarily on 
underwriting results at the individual case-level rather than enterprise-wide financial 
performance. As a result: 
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, the proportion of board-level underwriters is likely to be 
positively related with profitable underwriting performance. 
 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
Our data set covers an unbalanced panel of 92 non-life insurance firms (representing 
1,168 firm/year observations) that were operating and actively writing primary non-life 
insurance business in the UK for the 14 years from 1999 to 2012. Our analysis is conducted 
at the level of the UK statutory reporting insurance entity, which enables us to relate 
financial performance and other data to the relevant decision-making unit directly managed 
by UK board members. Our data set comprises: (a) insurance company data sourced from 
the Standard & Poor's Synthesys insurance companies’ database, which were compiled from 
the regulatory returns submitted annually by UK insurance companies to the industry 
regulator - the FSA12; and (b) biographical and other data on board composition and 
financial expertise which were obtained from published annual reports, industrial 
companies' databases (e.g., FAME and Thomson Reuters Datastream), and other sources 
(e.g., annual UK insurance company directories). All financial variables are audited end-of-
accounting year figures. Data relating to trust funds, and small protection and indemnity 
pools were excluded from our sample selection procedure as such entities do not directly 
underwrite much, if any, third party insurance business. Insurance syndicates at Lloyd's 
were also excluded from the data collection process as until 2005 their accounts were 
                                                          
12 Since 1 April 2013 the statutory supervision and regulation of UK insurers has been conducted by the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), whilst matters of insurance market operations are regulated by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA is part of the Bank of England and the FCA is an independent 
regulatory body which is accountable to HM Treasury. 
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prepared on a triennial rather than a comparative annual basis. We also eliminated 
firm/year cases with incomplete data and insurers in regulatory run-off (i.e., insurance pools 
that are technically insolvent and closed to new business). The timeframe covered by our 
study represents the earliest and latest years when complete data were available to us at 
the time the study was carried out. The period of analysis straddles a period of variable 
macroeconomic conditions and underwriting cycles (which we control for econometrically 
using year dummies) during which there were some small changes in the composition of the 
longitudinal data set (e.g., as a result of market exits and takeovers). Employing an 
unbalanced panel can nevertheless help mitigate sample survivorship bias. Our unbalanced 
panel sample of 92 non-life insurance firms constitutes roughly 30% of non-life insurers 
actively operating in the UK over our period of analysis, and comprises a mix of firms of 
varying size, ownership-type, and product-mix. The majority (90%) of the non-life insurers in 
our data set are stock forms of organization of which roughly a quarter are mono-line 
insurers that specialize in niche segments of the market (e.g., personal lines). Furthermore, 
most (82%) of the stock non-life insurers in the data set are non-listed private companies. 
Such variability in the sample panel data helps to enhance the robustness of the tests 
conducted and hence improves the reliability of the derived results. 
Model 
The primary econometric model that we employ to examine the empirical linkage 
between board-level financial experts and the performance of UK non-life insurance firms is 
2SLS estimation. The firm-level percentage of board-level financial experts (including type) 
can be affected by the percentage (type) of financial expert director in the insurance 
industry. Therefore, in a similar manner to Liu, Wei and Xie (2014) we use as an instrument 
variable (IV) the total number of financial expert directors in our sample minus the number 
of financial expert directors in each firm as a fraction of the total number of directors in our 
sample minus the aggregate number of directors in each firm. Similarly, we choose the 
percentage of each type of board-level financial expert in our sample as an IV for each 
specialty. We argue that these IVs take account of the availability of financial expertise in 
the UK insurance market and so will affect our measures of board-level financial expert and 
its three types; however, these IV measures are unlikely  to directly influence an insurance 
11 
 
firm's performance, other than through of our measures of financial expertise13. The 2SLS 
model that we use is: 
PERFit     = (PERFit-1, EXPERTSit, CONTROLSit,) + uit,    
where subscript i denotes ith firm (i = 1, … , 1,168), subscript t denotes the tth year (t = 1999, 
. . . 2012). PERFit is one of our six dependent variables – MARGIN, ROA, ROE, SOL, LR, and 
COR (as defined in Table 1 below). EXPERTSit, is either total financial experts or each of our 
selected three types of specialty, and CONTROLSit is a vector of board composition and firm-
level control variables (again as defined in Table 1). The disturbance term is specified as a 
two-way error component model (uit = μi + λt + νit) comprising unobservable firm-specific 
effects (μi), time-effects (λt), and a random disturbance term (νit).  
Boards-level Controls 
 
 Other governance considerations can affect the financial performance of insurance 
firms (Adams and Jiang, 2017). Therefore, we control for four board-level variables, namely: 
the proportion of outside (non-executive) directors on the board (OUTS); the separation of 
the Chairman/CEO positions (SEP); board size (BSIZE); and the existence of an audit 
committee (AUD).  
Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010), Cornelli, Kominek and Ljunqvist (2014), and 
others, argue that increasing outside directors to boards improves the effectiveness of 
monitoring and so reduces agency problems in firms. They add that the effectiveness of 
outside directors (OUTS) in reducing agency problems and maximizing value for 
shareholders will be influenced by a combination of personal attributes (e.g., their business 
acumen) and private incentives (e.g., the protection/promotion of their human capital 
value). Such factors are also likely to motivate outside directors to improve financial 
performance of the firms that they supervise and advise. On the other hand, Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) argue that if outside directors monitor CEOs and other executive directors 
too intensely then they risk alienation and thus losing access to key strategic information. 
Therefore, outsiders can face an ‘informational moral hazard’ problem, and so become 
ineffectual monitors of board activities. This situation could lead to outside directors being 
                                                          
13 As in Liu et al. (2014), our choice of instruments is also motivated by econometric considerations. We find 
using joint-F tests of association that our financial expert measures are significantly related to our IVs in the 
first-stage of the 2SLS analysis (at p≤0.10, or better) thereby satisfying the relevance restriction. Also the 
Hansen-J over-identification test indicated that statistically our IVs are uncorrelated with the regression error 
terms (at p≤0.10, or better) thereby supporting the exogeneity criterion. 
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associated with inferior rather than superior financial performance. However, in the 
insurance industry, professional support systems and sanctions together with regulatory 
monitoring and control mitigates the risk of financial professionals subrogating their 
responsibilities to act as custodians of policyholders’ and shareholders’ interests.  
Pi and Timme (1993) suggest that segregating the CEO and Chairman positions (SEP) 
results in a greater congruence between owners’ interests and corporate activities, whereas 
CEO/Chairman duality could exacerbate principal-agent incentive conflicts as control over 
board-level decisions could reside with a single dominant person. Hardwick et al. (2011) 
reason that compared with insurers with smaller boards (BSIZE), insurance firms with more 
members (including outsiders) are likely to bring more business knowledge and technical 
expertise to bear on resource allocation issues, and potentially complex strategic risk 
decisions. Audit committees (AUD) perform many important corporate governance 
functions, including strengthening the independence of outside directors and providing 
advice on operational, auditing, financial reporting, and regulatory and fiscal matters. Such a 
role can help mitigate agency costs arising from the separation of ownership from control, 
and so promote public confidence in the reported financial performance of firms (e.g., see 
Defond et al., 2005). Audit committees also have a wider monitoring and risk control 
function than other board committees, like remuneration and nomination committees, and 
so they are more likely to have a first-order effect on financial performance (Hoitash et al., 
2009). This aspect is likely to be particularly important in technically complex and 
idiosyncratic industries such as insurance (Hardwick et al., 2011).  
Firm-Specific Controls 
The corporate governance-performance relation could also be influenced by firms' 
characteristics. Therefore, we control for the effects of nine firm-specific variables in our 
analysis, namely: organizational form (OFORM), ownership concentration (CONC), 
managerial ownership (INSIDE), public listing status (LIST), CEO incentive compensation 
(BONUS), product-mix (P-MIX), reinsurance (REINS), firm size (lnSIZE), and firm age (AGE).  
Mayers and Smith’s (1981) analysis implies that policyholder-owned mutual forms of 
insurance organization are likely to perform financially less well than stock insurance firms 
because of their inherent difficulties in controlling managerial opportunism and associated 
agency costs. Also, unlike their counterparts in stock insurers, the managers of mutual 
insurers are not subject to the disciplining effects of the market for corporate control. 
Therefore, we predict that all else equal, mutual insurers will perform financially less well 
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than stock insurers. Grossman and Hart (1980) contend that concentrated ownership 
(CONC) can reduce agency problems and so improve firms’ performance as a result of more 
effective monitoring and control of board-level decisions by dominant investors. Cornelli et 
al. (2014) add that firms with dominant shareholders will expect the board of directors, 
particularly outsiders, to actively monitor and regularly question the decisions of CEOs. 
Accordingly, we predict that concentrated ownership will be positively related to firms’ 
financial performance. 
  Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) posit that insider ownership (INSIDE) motivates 
managers to act like shareholders and so reduces agency problems (costs) thus boosting 
financial performance. We also expect that manager-owners are likely to directly appoint 
and utilize specialist financial knowledge and expertise at the board-level in order to 
maximize their economic interest in the firm. This is particularly likely to be the case in 
technically complex and highly specialized sectors such as insurance. Insurance firms listed 
on major bourses (LIST), such as the London Stock Exchange, could also be motivated to 
perform better than other insurers in order to attract inflows of global investment (Miller, 
2011). We enter CEO incentive-based compensation (BONUS) into our analysis as the 
existence of a performance-related bonus system can motivate CEOs to maximize reported 
financial performance (Jiang, Adams and Jia-Upreti, 2012). A diversified mix of products (P-
MIX) can further produce economies of scale and scope for insurers, enabling them to 
realize input efficiencies in their management of risk pools and asset portfolios, and so 
boost reported period performance (Adams and Jiang, 2016).  
As loss-contingent capital, reinsurance (REINS) can improve capital allocation and 
usage and thus enhance profitability through increased underwriting capacity, lower 
insolvency risk, and reduced taxes (Abdul Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 2010). Reinsurers 
can also act as effective monitors and controllers of agency problems in primary insurers by 
limiting excessive and/or ill-considered managerial risk-taking in underwriting and 
investment decisions, thereby promoting their corporate financial strength and future 
profitability (Plantin, 2006). Therefore, all else equal, we predict a positive link between 
reinsurance and financial performance. Financial strength and performance are likely to 
improve as firms grow as a result of economies of scale and scope, and increased product-
market share. This situation can also arise because compared with their smaller 
counterparts, large insurers are able to retain and attract the managerial talent needed by 
them to realize operational efficiencies (e.g., through better resource allocation and usage) 
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(Hardwick et al., 2011). Therefore, other things being equal, we anticipate firm size (lnSIZE) 
to be positively related to financial performance. What is more, well-established insurance 
firms are likely to have competitive advantages over relatively new entrants in terms of 
acquired product-market knowledge, established distribution networks, and an existing 
customer-base (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). Therefore, the financial performance of a non-
life insurance firm is likely to be increasing in the length of time it has been operating in its 
respective product-markets. As such, we control for firm age (AGE) in our analysis.  
Interaction Terms 
Prior studies (e.g., Hardwick et al., 2011; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012; Kim et al., 
2014) acknowledge that corporate governance mechanisms can interact with each other. 
Failure to control for the possible interaction among governance mechanisms could thus 
result in misleading conclusions. However, including too many interaction terms in 
regression models raises concerns about multicollinearity. Therefore, in the interest of 
parsimony we only introduce two-way multiplicative interactions between our three 
primary independent variables representing each functional specialty and board size. Our 
reasoning is that performance-related synergies could arise from a combined set of financial 
skills at the board-level. An insurer's information environment and the overall effectiveness 
of financial expertise on the board could also be enhanced in conjunction with the 
knowledge and experience of other non-financial board members (Anderson et al., 2011). 
This implies a positive interactive-effect between financial expertise on the board and the 
size of that board14. Moreover, to reduce the effects of multicollinearity the component 
variables of the interaction terms are centered at their mean values before being entered in 
the regression analysis. 
Variables 
 The dependent and independent variables that enter our analysis are defined in 
Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
 
                                                          
14  To examine for potential incentive conflicts between board members' interests and corporate performance  
we also tested for an interaction-effect between outside (non-executive) directors and financial experts (OUTS 
x EXPERT). However, the result was not statistically significant.  
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 (panels A to C) gives the descriptive statistics for our dependent and 
independent variables. Table 2, panel A indicates generally sound mean rates of 
performance for our panel sample of insurance firms for each of the six financial indicators 
examined. Panel A of Table 2 also shows that for the whole sample period (1999-2012), on 
average, 41% of board directors are members of professional financial bodies, with 19% 
being accountants (ACCOUNS), 17% underwriters (UWS), and 5% actuaries (ACTS). Panels B 
and C indicate that the proportion of total financial experts on board increased from 38% in 
1999 to 44% in 2012. This increase was particularly noticeable with regard to accounting 
representation on the board where the proportion grew from 16% to 21% over the period 
of analysis. In contrast, the proportion of actuaries and underwriters remained constant 
over time. This hints at a growing demand for board-level accounting expertise in line with 
recent developments in corporate reporting and accounting (e.g., IFRS 4). In addition, the 
overall mean percentage of board-level actuaries is (at 5%) lower than mean of 16% 
reported by Hardwick et al. (2011) for the UK life insurance industry between the mid-1990s 
and mid-2000s. This difference reflects the less prevalent actuarial presence in the non-life 
insurance compared with the life insurance sector that has been identified by prior studies 
such as Froot and O’Connell (2008). The average board size of approximately 8 members 
reported in Panel A of Table 2 is nonetheless consistent with Hardwick et al.’s (2011) UK life 
insurance industry study. 
 In line with the UK's 1992 Cadbury and 2003 Higgs reports on corporate governance, 
outsiders represent a majority of board members (at 60% on average per panel A). This 
reflects an increasing trend over our period of analysis (from 52% in 1999 to 66% of board 
members in 2012). Again consistent with established UK corporate governance guidelines, 
most non-life insurers in our sample separate the CEO and Chairman functions and have 
audit committees. Roughly 90% of firm/year observations in our panel data set relate to 
stock forms of organization with approximately two-thirds of these cases having dominant 
(block) shareholders. Just over a third (36%) of non-life insurers on average specifically have 
equity ownership schemes as part of a senior management compensation package, with a 
mean majority (80%) having broader (e.g., cash-based) board-level incentive bonus plans. 
Table 2, panel A also shows that the average age of non-life insurance firms in our panel 
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data set is 46 years (with a SD = 33 years) indicating that though there is age variation in the 
distribution of the sample, most of our firms are established insurance providers. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Table 3, we conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to determine whether 
statistically significant differences exist across our six financial performance measures 
according to the levels of total board-level financial expertise and by the levels of functional 
specialty. For each year, we group firm/year observations into low and high categories 
based on whether the measure of financial performance is below or above its mean value. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that a high (above-mean) aggregate level of financial expertise on 
the board has larger MARGIN, ROA, and ROE, and lower SOL, LR and COR, relative to board-
rooms with low (below-mean) amounts of  financial expertise. The F-statistics indicate that 
differences between the two categories are significant (at p≤0.01, 2-tail). A similar pattern is 
also observed when we conducted ANOVA tests by specialty, particularly in the case of 
ACCOUNS and to a lesser extent, ACTS. However, when comparing between the low and 
high levels of UWS, the differences for MARGIN, ROA, ROE, and COR are not statistically 
significant. This tentatively suggests that underwriters at the board-level do not significantly 
influence earnings-based measures of performance. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Table 4 presents the correlation coefficient matrix for the variables used in the 
study. Panel A reveals statistically significant inverse associations (at p≤0.10 or better, 2-tail) 
between our earnings-based measures - MARGIN, ROA and ROE - and the solvency 
(leverage) and underwriting performance indicators – SOL, LR and COR. These results accord 
with our expectations as profitability in the non-life insurance industry is usually associated 
with low leverage (hence less default risk for policyholders) and lower than expected claims 
and operating costs (Browne and Kamiya, 2012). We also observe statistically significant 
correlations (at p≤0.10 or better, 2-tail) between our performance variables and EXPERTS 
and ACCOUNS that are in line with what we predict – i.e., the observed association between 
EXPERTS/ACCOUNS and MARGIN, ROA, and ROE is positive and the association between 
EXPERTS/ACCOUNS and SOL, LR and COR is negative. Correlations between our performance 
variables and ACTS/UWS are also in our expected direction, but the magnitudes are 
generally not as strong as those for ACCOUNS; in fact, some correlation coefficients are 
insignificant. This suggests that accountants on the board could be playing a predominant 
role in the strategic decision-making process of our sample of insurance firms. Consistent 
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with prior studies (e.g., Hoitash, et al., 2009), we also observe that EXPERTS is positively and 
significantly correlated with other governance variables such as OUTS and AUD (at p≤0.10 or 
better, 2-tail). This indicates that board-level financial expertise is an integral part of the 
overall governance systems of non-life insurance firms. Aside from the expected positive 
and statistically significant correlations between size-related variables (e.g., BSIZE and 
lnSIZE), most associations are moderate suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be 
problematical. However, to test further for multicollinearity, we follow Kennedy (2003) and 
derive variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables. We find that all VIF 
values are below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue when 
interpreting our empirical results. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Multivariate Results 
Financial Expertise and Performance 
 Table 5 gives the 2SLS results for the effect of EXPERTS on each of our six financial 
performance indicators. Our results indicate that collectively, financially qualified directors 
have, as expected (H1), a positive and statistically significant impact on all of the three 
earnings-based measures MARGIN, ROA and ROE (at p≤0.05, 2-tail). In practical terms, a 1% 
change in board-level financial expertise can increase net profit margin by 0.04%, returns on 
assets by 0.05% and returns on equity by 0.06%. Also consistent with what we hypothesized 
(H1), the coefficient estimate for EXPERTS is negatively related to LR and COR (at p≤0.01, 2-
tail). Therefore, increasing the fraction of board-level financial expertise by 1% has a positive 
impact on underwriting performance by respectively reducing the loss ratio by 0.10% and 
combined ratio by 0.12%. The coefficient estimate for EXPERTS is also statistically negatively 
significant with regard to leverage. In particular, a 1% change in board-level financial 
expertise can improve the solvency (SOL) position (lower leverage) by about 4.5%. These 
observations suggest that overall professionally qualified financial experts have a beneficial 
impact on financial performance in the UK's non-life insurance sector. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 The proportion of outsiders on the board (OUTS) is related to superior solvency 
(lower leverage) and sound underwriting performance (at p≤0.10 or better, 2-tail). However, 
contrary to our predictions, the size of the board (BSIZE) is inversely related to profit margin 
(MARGIN) and is associated with poor underwriting performance (high loss ratios (LR) and 
combined ratios (COR)) (at p≤0.05 or better, 2-tail). These findings accord with some prior 
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studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996) that argue that limits on board seats can be more 
performance-effective than large boards because they economize on the costs of 
information provision and coordination, and are more likely to make decisive strategic 
judgements. Therefore, smaller boards could actually be better suited to technically 
complex businesses such as non-life insurance. Table 5 also shows that the coefficient 
estimates for lnSIZE are inversely related to ROA and ROE (at p≤0.01, 2-tail). This suggests 
that 'natural' economic benefits arising from increased firm size - for example, scale and 
scope economies - could be blunted as a result of market changes in new technology 
applications and increased competition from smaller niche operators. As Custódio and 
Metzger (2014) point out, changing business environments necessitate that board-level 
financial experts will need to be 'sophisticates' in their field of specialty in order to 
contribute positively to strategic innovation, and improved and sustainable corporate 
performance. The only other notable features gleaned from Table 5 that are generally 
consistent with what we expected, are that the coefficient estimate for audit committee 
(AUD) - a variable often associated with board-level financial expertise - is positively related 
with MARGIN (at p≤0.10, 2-tail), and the estimated coefficient for managerial ownership 
(INSIDE) is associated with superior profitability as measured by MARGIN and ROA (at 
p≤0.10 or better, 2-tail). However, the coefficient estimates for audit committee (AUD) are 
insignificant for our other performance measures. The mixed results with regard to AUD 
could, as reported in Bryan, Liu, Tiras and Zhuang (2013), indicate that the presence of 
financial experts on audit committees may not necessarily be a prerequisite for effective 
governance and the realization of sound corporate performance.  
Table 6 gives our multivariate results for each of the three types of financial expert 
examined in this study. Consistent with our hypotheses (H2 and H3), Table 6 reports 
statistically significant and correctly signed coefficient estimates for ACCOUNS and ACTS (at 
p≤0.01, 2-tail). This observation suggests that board-level accountants and actuaries play an 
affirmative role in setting commercially appropriate premiums, controlling claims and 
operating costs, and monitoring statutory solvency levels. As we expected (H4), insurance 
underwriters are also found to be significantly related to sound solvency levels and 
underwriting results (at p≤0.01, 2-tail) but are not significantly linked with earnings-based 
performance measures despite such measures being important to investors (Nissim, 2013).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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To test for conjoint-effects amongst board-level financial experts, we also 
incorporate in our analysis interaction terms between each of the specialties and 
collectively with board size. The results are reported in Table 7. Panel A of Table 7 shows 
that the interaction of EXPERTS and BSIZE is not statistically significant for any of our six 
measures of financial performance. This suggest that at least to some degree, the 
contribution of financial experts to period performance could be blunted by large boards 
with too many non-financial members with conflicting strategic views. Table 7 (panel B) 
further reveals that interaction terms between financial specialties are insignificant, 
suggesting that liaisons between different board-level financial experts does not appear to 
have tangible synergistic benefits for the financial performance of non-life insurance firms15.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Robustness Tests 
 In addition to 2SLS, we follow prior research (e.g., Masulis, et al., 2012; Liu et al., 
2014) and employ alternative estimations to address potential endogeneity between board-
level financial experts and the performance of insurance firms. First, we re-estimate our 
regression analysis using firm fixed-effects that control for time-invariant firm-specific 
factors that relate to both board-level financial expertise and corporate performance. 
Second, we use one-year lagged financial expert measures and one-year lagged board and 
firm characteristic variables in our models to replace the contemporary ones since board-
level financial experts are likely to need time to influence corporate performance. This 
procedure is estimated using both the fixed-effects and 2SLS approaches. We find that our 
results are robust to these alternative approaches.  
 We also investigated whether or not the promulgation of the insurance accounting 
standard IFRS 4 (2004) impacted on the financial expert-performance relation amongst our 
sample of insurance firms. IFRS 4 was issued in March 2004 and became effective from 
January 2005 and is applicable to all insurers (and reinsurers) operating in the UK, Europe, 
and elsewhere (except for the US). Whilst IFRS 4 can guide the work of an insurer's external 
auditors, statutory compliance under EU law (Regulation No. 1606/2002) applies only to the 
consolidated financial statements of main stock exchange listed companies. The standard 
largely covers the recognition and treatment of accounting items (e.g., reserves) and seeks 
to promote greater public disclosure (e.g., of risk management policies). As reserving errors 
directly affect insurers' reported period earnings (Anthony and Petroni, 1997), the increased 
                                                          
15 In sensitivity tests, the interactive effects of EXPERTS and OUTS on our six measures of financial performance 
did not yield statistically significant results and so are not reported.  
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disclosure requirements of IFRS 4 (e.g., with regard to the assumptions underpinning future 
estimated losses and reserve levels) could also influence accounting performance. 
Furthermore, the impact of IFRS 4 is potentially important as it could lower information and 
agency costs, and could enhance financial performance by improving the effectiveness of 
board-level monitoring, control, and advice. Additionally, the introduction of IFRS 4 could 
directly influence the degree of board-level financial expertise in UK-based insurance firms 
as it becomes a benchmark for the conduct and attestation of the annual external audit. On 
the other hand, IFRS 4 could have a negative impact on reported period performance by 
increasing the costs of board-level governance (e.g., financial experts) and external auditing. 
The adoption of IFRS 4 could also reduce the scope for using earnings management 
techniques (e.g., reserve accruals) that maximize payoffs under executive bonus plans. 
 To visualize the effect of IFRS 4 on our main variables of interest, we developed four 
trend figures. Figures 1 and 2 give the year-by-year average trends in financial performance, 
while figures 3 and 4 illustrates the percentage trend in board-level financial experts (and 
type of financial expert) and audit committees over our period of analysis (1999-2012).   
[Insert Figures 1 to 4 here] 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate a generally declining trend across the six financial performance 
indicators after 2005/6 - a phenomenon largely due to macroeconomic effects such as 
falling investment returns, increased competitive pressure on premium rates, and from 
2007/8, the effects of the global financial crisis (Swiss Re, 2010). On the other hand, Figure 3 
shows a modest gradual increase in the percentage of board-level accountants and 
actuaries; however, Figure 4 presents a more dramatic rise in the use of audit committees 
since 2004/5. Therefore, IFRS 4 appears to be associated with a greater presence of financial 
experts but declining average rates of financial performance across our sample of panel 
insurance firms. Tentatively, this observation could support the view of recent research 
(e.g., Bryan et al., 2013; Custódio and Metzger, 2014) that sustainable corporate 
performance may be conditional on other (e.g., sales and marketing) board-level skill-sets 
rather than just financial expertise.  
 To test further the impact of IFRS 4 on our results, we constructed a dummy variable 
equal to 0 for the years 1999-2003 and 1 for the years 2005-2012 to capture the 
performance-effect of IFRS 4 on the financial performance of our panel of insurance firms. 
We then interact the IFRS 4 dummy with financial experts (EXPERTS x IFRS4) and audit 
committee (AUD x IFRS4) to ascertain whether IFRS 4 had a mediating effect between 
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board-level financial expertise and audit committees and their link with financial 
performance. The regression results are reported in Panel C of Table 7. Panel C of Table 7 
reveals that the introduction of IFRS 4 had a statistically negative impact on our earnings-
based measures of performance (at p≤0.10 or better, 2-tail), suggesting the accounting 
standard could have reduced managerial scope for earnings enhancement. We also find that 
the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms EXPERTS x IFRS4 and AUD x IFRS4 are 
insignificant for all our performance measures except for EXPERTS x IFRS4 in the case of LR. 
This result implies that in general, board-level financial experts do not use the provisions of 
IFRS 4 to help guide decisions that impact directly on various aspects of financial 
performance. Overall, our results with regard to the introduction of IFRS 4 suggest that 
board composition is largely an endogenous choice decision in UK non-life insurance firms. 
 Finally, to examine the effect of the 2007/8 global financial crisis on board 
composition and performance we conducted a sensitivity test that involved partitioning our 
panel sample into two sub-periods - the first covering the years up to 2008 and second the 
years up to 2012. However, this sensitivity test did not produce statistically significant 
results. The test also supports the view of Malafronte, Poizio and Starita (2015) that 
generally better business diversification and liquidity levels enabled insurers to perform 
better than banks in the aftermath of the 2007/8 global financial crisis.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Using unbalanced panel data (1999 to 2012) from the UK's non-life insurance 
industry we examine the collective and individual impact on six performance indicators of 
three types of professionally qualified board-level financial expert - accountants, actuaries 
and underwriters. We find that collectively, financial experts have a beneficial influence on 
the performance outcomes of insurers. We also observe that board-level qualified 
accountants and actuaries are linked with superior performance in all six of our selected 
financial outcome measures. Professional insurance underwriters are associated with sound 
solvency levels (low leverage) and underwriting results, but not with positive earnings-based 
measures. This suggests that underwriters may not be as adept at group-level earnings 
enhancement as accountants and actuaries. Additionally, we find that the introduction of 
IFRS 4 in 2004/5 did not have a significant impact on board composition and financial 
outcomes. 
 We consider that our research contributes to the growing literature that examines 
the corporate governance-financial performance relation in terms of the personal 
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characteristics and functional expertise of board directors. Our results suggest that in the 
insurance sector professional accounting and actuarial expertise at the board-level is likely 
to be relatively more important than underwriting expertise for ensuring positive group-
level financial outcomes. This insight could usefully inform insurance-specific regulations 
(e.g., with regard to the regulatory approval of insurance company board members), and 
shape future corporate governance guidelines for the international insurance industry, and 
indeed, other parts of the financial services sector (e.g., banking). For the underwriting 
profession our results, at least tentatively, point to a need to reassess and develop 
standards of professional training and education to more closely reflect the requirements of 
securing group-level financial performance targets. Our study also indicates that the 
introduction of IFRS 4 did not have a positive effect on financial outcomes, and that the 
standard had only a minor and statistically insignificant effect on the composition of 
financial experts on the boards of insurance firms. Therefore, board-level financial expertise 
may not be the sole panacea for realizing sound and sustainable corporate performance. 
Overall, our analysis implies that the way boards are constituted in insurance firms is largely 
an endogenous process.   
 Finally, we believe that the key conclusion of our study - that professionally qualified 
financial expertise at the board-level matters for performance - has implications for other 
parts of the financial services sector (e.g., banking) where corporate governance is a 
strategically important commercial and policy issue. In addition, the importance of financial 
professionals on the board is further relevant for emerging insurance markets (e.g., China) 
that are in the process of developing their regulatory and corporate governance systems. 
Therefore, this study could stimulate further research on the role of board-level financial 
experts on accounting and financial decisions in non-life insurance firms - such as their 
impact on the incidence and extent on reported loss reserving errors. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables    Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
MARGIN   
Net profit margin - measured as post-tax ÷ interest earnings to gross premiums 
written 
ROA 
Return on assets - measured as net operating income before interest and taxes ÷ 
total assets 
ROE   
Return on equity - measured as net operating income before interest and taxes 
/issued (& paid-up)equity  
SOL 
Solvency position (Leverage) - measured as 1-surplus (capital +reserves)/total 
assets  
LR  Loss ratio - measured as total incurred (paid + reserved) claims /total earned 
premiums 
COR  Combined  ratio - measured as total incurred (paid + reserved) claims + expenses 
(acquisition & management)/ total earned premiums 
Independent Variables 
EXPERTS 
the number of total financial experts divided by board size (the definition of board 
size can be found below) 
ACCOUNS 
the number of professionally qualified accountants on the board divided by board 
size 
ACTS the number of professionally qualified actuaries on the board divided by board size 
UWS the professionally qualified underwriters on the board divided by board size 
Boards-Level Controls 
OUTS % outsiders (non-executive directors) on the board 
SEP Dummy variable equal to 1 for separate Chairman/CEO, 0 otherwise 
BSIZE Board size - the total number of board members 
AUD Dummy variable equal to 1 for an audit committee, 0 otherwise 
Firm-Specific Controls 
OFORM Dummy variable equal to 1 for stock insurer, 0 for mutual insurer  
CONC % shares in issue held by the top-3 shareholders  
INSIDE Dummy variable equal to 1 for managerial share scheme, 0 otherwise 
LIST Dummy variable equal to 1 if an insurer is publicly listed, 0 otherwise 
BONUS Dummy variable equal to 1 for board-level bonus plan, 0 otherwise 
P-MIX Herfindahl index – closer to 1 the more concentrated the product-mix  
REINS Reinsurance ceded divided by gross written premiums 
LnSIZE The natural logarithm of total assets 
AGE The number of years since a firm's establishment 
Note: Financial variables are measured as annual figures.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: 1999-2012 
 
N Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
MARGIN 1168 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.30 0.46 
ROA 1168 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.50 0.42 
ROE 1168 0.22 0.20 0.14 -0.62 0.76 
SOL 1168 0.65 0.65 0.10 0.40 0.94 
LR 1168 0.80 0.84 0.10 0.54 0.99 
COR 1168 0.89 0.91 0.10 0.61 1.30 
EXPERTS 1168 0.41 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.75 
ACCOUNS 1168 0.19 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.43 
ACTS 1168 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.40 
UWS 1168 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.50 
OUTS 1168 0.60 0.63 0.11 0.00 0.80 
SEP 1168 0.87 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE 1168 7.85 8.00 2.29 3.00 14.00 
AUD 1168 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
OFORM 1168 0.90 1.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 
CONC 1168 0.66 0.70 0.30 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 1168 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
LIST 1168 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
BONUS 1168 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
P-MIX 1168 0.58 0.58 0.22 0.13 1.00 
REINS 1168 0.31 0.31 0.07 0.03 0.75 
lnSIZE 1168 4.57 3.95 1.68 2.30 10.00 
AGE 1168 46.44 33.00 33.01 1.00 133.00 
Panel B: Year 1999 
      
 
N Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
MARGIN 92 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.12 0.40 
ROA 92 0.08 0.10 0.10 -0.50 0.26 
ROE 92 0.17 0.20 0.18 -0.62 0.50 
SOL 92 0.66 0.65 0.11 0.43 0.90 
LR 92 0.86 0.86 0.06 0.70 0.98 
COR 92 0.95 0.95 0.06 0.79 1.20 
EXPERTS 92 0.38 0.40 0.17 0.00 0.75 
ACCOUNS 92 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.43 
ACTS 92 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.40 
UWS 92 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.50 
OUTS 92 0.52 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.70 
SEP 92 0.84 1.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE 92 6.19 6.00 1.77 3.00 11.00 
AUD 92 0.63 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
OFORM 92 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
CONC 92 0.68 0.70 0.30 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 92 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LIST 92 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
BONUS 92 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
P-MIX 92 0.57 0.55 0.22 0.13 1.00 
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REINS 92 0.32 0.32 0.08 0.18 0.75 
lnSIZE 92 4.22 3.69 1.64 2.30 10.00 
AGE 92 39.44 26.50 31.26 2.00 122.00 
Panel C: Year 2012 
      
 
N Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
MARGIN 72 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.15 
ROA 72 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.30 
ROE 72 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.60 
SOL 72 0.65 0.65 0.09 0.45 0.85 
LR 72 0.84 0.86 0.07 0.63 0.96 
COR 72 0.93 0.95 0.07 0.70 1.04 
EXPERTS 72 0.44 0.41 0.10 0.17 0.67 
ACCOUNS 72 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.33 
ACTS 72 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.30 
UWS 72 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.38 
OUTS 72 0.66 0.67 0.06 0.50 0.75 
SEP 72 0.93 1.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE 72 9.94 10.00 1.72 6.00 14.00 
AUD 72 0.88 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
OFORM 72 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
CONC 72 0.64 0.67 0.30 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 72 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LIST 72 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
BONUS 72 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
P-MIX 72 0.58 0.60 0.21 0.13 1.00 
REINS 72 0.31 0.30 0.07 0.22 0.75 
lnSIZE 72 4.81 4.06 1.79 2.89 9.44 
AGE 72 57.13 41.50 33.60 15.00 121.00 
Note: This table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for our 
dependent and independent variables. Panel A presents statistics for all available sample years from 1999 to 
2012. For the purpose of trend comparison panel B presents statistics for 1999 and panel C for 2012. All 
variables are given in Table 1. For the full panel the raw (unlogged) value of firm size (SIZE)  is £655 million; the 
mean value of equity is £25 million; average earnings before interest and tax (EBITA) is £61 million; and 
average annual gross premiums is £700million. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Performance Measures Conditional on the Type of Financial Expertise 
 
 
   Obs. MARGIN ROA ROE SOL LR COR 
Panel A: By EXPERTS 
Low: EXPERTS < Mean    595 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.70 0.84 0.93 
High: EXPERTS > Mean    573 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.61 0.76 0.85 
P-Value (F-test) for the difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: By ACCOUNS 
      
Low: ACCOUNS < Mean    496 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.68 0.83 0.91 
High: ACCOUNS  > Mean    672 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.63 0.78 0.87 
P-Value (F-test) for the difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel C: By ACTS 
      
Low: ACTS < Mean    806 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.68 0.82 0.90 
High: ACTS> Mean    362 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.60 0.76 0.85 
P-Value (F-test) for the difference 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel D: By UWS 
      
Low: UWS < Mean    563 0.08 0.11 0.22 0.67 0.81 0.89 
High: UWS > Mean    605 0.08 0.11 0.22 0.64 0.80 0.88 
P-Value (F-test) for the difference 0.64 0.28 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.11 
Note: For each year, we group the sample into low and high categories depending on whether the measure for 
financial expertise (or each type of financial expert - accountants, actuaries, and underwriters) is below or 
above its mean value. The mean value for each performance measure is reported for each defined category. 
The ANOVA test is then conducted to test for statistically significant differences in mean values between low 
and high groups. The F-statistics' p-values are 2-tail. Better financial performance is captured by larger values 
for MARGIN, ROA and ROE, and smaller values for SOL, LR and COR. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 4: Panel A: Correlation Matrix between Dependent Variables and Financial Experts 
 
 
MARGIN ROA ROE SOL LR COR 
MARGIN 
 
     
ROA 0.48* 
 
    
ROE 0.41* 0.77* 
 
   
SOL -0.42* -0.33* -0.22* 
 
  
LR -0.47* -0.44* -0.34* 0.50* 
  
COR -0.47* -0.45* -0.34* 0.48* 0.92* 
 
EXPERTS 0.43* 0.38* 0.31* -0.59* -0.54* -0.50* 
ACCOUNS 0.34* 0.36* 0.31* -0.29* -0.32* -0.31* 
ACTS 0.31* 0.05* 0.02 -0.36* -0.33* -0.29* 
UWS 0.02 0.14* 0.12* -0.29* -0.19* -0.18* 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix between Independent Variables and Financial Experts 
 
 
EXPERTS ACCOUNS ACTS UWS OUTS SEP BSIZE AUD OFORM CONC INSIDE LIST BONUS P-MIX REINS lnSIZE 
EXPERTS 1.00 
               
ACCOUNS 0.57* 1.00 
              
ACTS 0.54* 0.00 1.00 
             
UWS 0.45* -0.24* -0.01 1.00 
            
OUTS 0.38* 0.28* 0.14* 0.14* 1.00 
           
SEP 0.26* 0.07* 0.11* 0.23* 0.35* 1.00 
          
BSIZE 0.39* 0.28* 0.40* -0.07* 0.54* 0.21* 1.00 
         
AUD 0.30* 0.23* 0.27* -0.08* 0.38* 0.29* 0.45* 1.00 
        
OFORM -0.12* -0.11* -0.12* 0.03 -0.07* -0.04 -0.12* -0.04 1.00 
       
CONC -0.15* -0.15* -0.04 -0.03 -0.18* -0.37* -0.09* -0.16* 0.62* 1.00 
      
INSIDE 0.25* 0.18* 0.37* -0.18* 0.08* -0.07* 0.34* 0.15* 0.19* 0.18* 1.00 
     
LIST 0.28* 0.22* 0.51* -0.29* 0.19* 0.01 0.47* 0.28* 0.06* 0.10* 0.55* 1.00 
    
BONUS 0.14* 0.12* 0.00 0.11* 0.16* 0.42* 0.13* 0.19* 0.58* 0.11* 0.14* 0.02 1.00 
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P-MIX -0.15* 0.05* -0.25* -0.08* -0.19* -0.24* -0.30* -0.20* -0.18* 0.03 -0.19* -0.21* -0.33* 1.00 
  
REINS -0.21* -0.04 -0.20* -0.11* -0.24* -0.13* -0.17* -0.29* -0.06* 0.08* -0.32* -0.26* -0.27* 0.36* 1.00 
 
lnSIZE 0.32* 0.20* 0.53* -0.18* 0.23* 0.05 0.61* 0.22* -0.14* -0.05* 0.40* 0.61* 0.04 -0.34* -0.13* 1.00 
AGE 0.21* 0.12* 0.17* 0.04* 0.13* 0.22* 0.20* 0.02 -0.12* -0.22* 0.17* 0.11* 0.01 -0.29* -0.19* 0.21* 
Note: Table 4 presents correlation coefficients for the independent variables in panel A and dependent variables in Panel B. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported for 
metric pairs, and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported for correlations involving 1 or 2 non-metric variables. *indicates that coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 10% level or better, 2-tail. Variable definitions are given in Table 1.  
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Table 5:  Total Financial Experts and Insurance Firm Performance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MARGIN ROA ROE SOL LR COR 
INTERCEPT -0.045*** -0.007 -0.027 0.103*** 0.181*** 0.327*** 
 
(-2.774) (-0.416) (-0.955) (4.813) (6.701) (3.110) 
L.DEP 0.752*** 0.756*** 0.852*** 0.865*** 0.812*** 0.698*** 
 
(9.683) (17.048) (31.763) (48.369) (40.546) (7.303) 
EXPERTS 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.057** -0.045*** -0.099*** -0.120*** 
 
(3.355) (2.765) (2.118) (-3.267) (-7.044) (-3.838) 
OUTS 0.020 0.026 0.029 -0.029* -0.030* -0.051** 
 
(1.478) (1.200) (0.763) (-1.857) (-1.784) (-2.402) 
SEP 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.009) (-0.575) (-1.168) (0.780) (0.446) (0.752) 
BSIZE 0.002** 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003*** 0.003** 
 
(2.097) (1.015) (1.340) (0.268) (2.762) (2.023) 
AUD 0.004* 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(1.736) (0.728) (-0.254) (0.066) (-0.131) (-0.360) 
OFORM 0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.015 
 
(0.966) (-0.985) (0.019) (0.632) (1.420) (1.473) 
CONC 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.054) (-0.464) (0.234) (1.364) (-0.819) (-0.821) 
INSIDE 0.005* 0.007** 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(1.909) (2.212) (1.325) (-1.643) (-1.255) (-1.200) 
LIST -0.008** -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(-2.110) (-1.156) (0.363) (0.190) (-0.581) (-0.281) 
BONUS -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.992) (-0.449) (-0.078) (0.086) (0.094) (0.005) 
P-MIX 0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.887) (-0.349) (0.494) (0.963) (1.172) (0.564) 
REINS 0.018 0.018 0.030 0.024 0.016 0.020 
 
(1.414) (1.057) (1.196) (1.373) (0.865) (1.025) 
lnSIZE 0.000 -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.271) (-3.772) (-3.819) (0.522) (0.548) (0.480) 
AGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.101) (0.966) (0.945) (0.157) (0.307) (-0.826) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.740 0.811 0.872 0.826 0.712 
Note: This table reports the results of the 2SLS estimations with the percentage of financial expert directors in 
the insurance industry as an instrument for EXPERTS. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses, while ***, 
**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and10% levels respectively in 2-tail tests. L.DEP is the lagged 
dependent variables (MARGIN, ROA, ROE, SOL, LR and COR). Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Better 
financial performance is captured by larger values for MARGIN, ROA and ROE, and smaller values for SOL, LR 
and COR. 
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Table 6: Individual Type of Financial Experts and Insurance Firm Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MARGIN ROA ROE SOL LR COR 
INTERCEPT -0.035*** 0.002 -0.003 0.093*** 0.169*** 0.313*** 
 
(-3.210) (0.125) (-0.114) (4.991) (7.238) (9.979) 
L.DEP 0.746*** 0.754*** 0.852*** 0.864*** 0.813*** 0.697*** 
 
(38.641) (41.139) (55.143) (57.539) (44.643) (31.152) 
ACCOUNS 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.078*** -0.041*** -0.112*** -0.130*** 
 
(4.098) (4.102) (3.069) (-2.647) (-6.456) (-5.829) 
ACTS 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.085*** -0.037* -0.094*** -0.134*** 
 
(4.062) (2.917) (2.588) (-1.840) (-4.116) (-4.602) 
UWS 0.016 0.024 0.022 -0.054*** -0.085*** -0.099*** 
 
(1.400) (1.586) (0.818) (-3.286) (-4.686) (-4.283) 
OUTS 0.026** 0.029** 0.035 -0.027* -0.031* -0.055** 
 
(2.210) (1.999) (1.361) (-1.766) (-1.829) (-2.506) 
SEP 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.310) (-0.131) (-0.743) (0.764) (0.085) (0.302) 
BSIZE 0.002** 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003** 0.003** 
 
(2.324) (0.906) (1.245) (0.222) (2.535) (2.118) 
AUD 0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 
(1.300) (0.200) (-0.680) (-0.114) (0.141) (-0.051) 
OFORM 0.007 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.013 
 
(1.298) (-0.642) (0.317) (0.722) (1.239) (1.315) 
CONC 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
 
(0.122) (-0.266) (0.319) (1.449) (-0.933) (-0.856) 
INSIDE 0.005** 0.006** 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(2.083) (2.128) (1.116) (-1.561) (-1.231) (-0.923) 
LIST -0.010*** -0.007 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 
(-2.594) (-1.385) (-0.164) (-0.046) (-0.376) (0.059) 
BONUS -0.006* -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 
(-1.673) (-0.913) (-0.426) (-0.073) (0.361) (0.203) 
P-MIX 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.005 
 
(0.643) (-0.613) (0.328) (0.920) (1.343) (0.569) 
REINS 0.020 0.016 0.030 0.024 0.018 0.020 
 
(1.487) (0.973) (0.995) (1.389) (0.937) (0.788) 
lnSIZE 0.000 -0.004*** -0.007*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.030) (-3.077) (-3.049) (0.353) (0.484) (0.479) 
AGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.701) (0.660) (0.735) (0.135) (0.386) (-0.612) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
R-squared 0.749 0.747 0.816 0.875 0.830 0.719 
Note: This table reports the results of the 2SLS estimations with the percentage of each type of financial 
experts in the insurance industry as an instrument for ACCOUNS, ACTS and UWS respectively. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses, while ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and10% levels 
respectively in 2-tail tests. L.DEP is the lagged dependent variables (MARGIN, ROA, ROE, SOL, LR and COR). 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Better financial performance is captured by larger values for MARGIN, 
ROA and ROE, and smaller values for SOL, LR and COR. 
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Table 7: The Interaction Effects of Financial Experts on Insurance Firm Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
MARGIN ROA ROE SOL LR COR 
Panel A: PERFit     = (PERFit-1, EXPERTSit, EXPERTSit×BSIZEit, CONTROLSit) + uit 
EXPERTS 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.058** -0.046*** -0.098*** -0.120*** 
 
(3.319) (2.801) (2.156) (-3.425) (-7.108) (-3.735) 
EXPERTS×BSIZE -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
(-0.366) (-0.030) (0.236) (1.305) (1.098) (0.724) 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
R-squared 0.747 0.747 0.816 0.875 0.830 0.719 
Panel B: PERFit     = (PERFit-1, ACCOUNSit, ACTSit, UWSit, ACCOUNSit×ACTSit, ACCOUNSit×UWSit, 
ACTSit×UWSit,   CONTROLSit) + uit 
ACCOUNS 0.043*** 0.066*** 0.085*** -0.033** -0.109*** -0.128*** 
 
(3.562) (4.270) (3.162) (-2.056) (-5.996) (-5.498) 
ACTS 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.089** -0.032 -0.085*** -0.122*** 
 
(3.486) (2.970) (2.412) (-1.441) (-3.388) (-3.816) 
UWS 0.015 0.025 0.017 -0.058*** -0.082*** -0.096*** 
 
(1.180) (1.543) (0.600) (-3.327) (-4.306) (-3.943) 
ACCOUNS×ACTS 0.017 0.046 -0.194 0.267 0.095 0.090 
 
(0.115) (0.248) (-0.589) (1.392) (0.438) (0.321) 
ACCOUNS×UWS -0.021 -0.087 -0.322 -0.100 0.030 0.076 
 
(-0.231) (-0.762) (-1.608) (-0.854) (0.228) (0.448) 
ACTS×UWS 0.048 -0.150 -0.402 0.225 -0.182 -0.278 
 
(0.312) (-0.770) (-1.175) (1.133) (-0.809) (-0.954) 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
R-squared 0.749 0.748 0.817 0.875 0.831 0.720 
Panel C: PERFit     = (PERFit-1, EXPERTSit, IFRSit, EXPERTSit×IFRSit, CONTROLSit) + uit 
EXPERTS 0.045*** 0.045** 0.077* -0.042** -0.119*** -0.128*** 
 
(3.039) (2.117) (1.937) (-2.057) (-6.744) (-5.625) 
IFRS4 -0.017* -0.027*** -0.032** 0.005 0.012 0.035 
 
(-1.861) (-2.887) (-2.177) (0.483) (1.179) (1.602) 
EXPERTS×IFRS4 -0.016 0.001 -0.033 -0.004 0.044** 0.017 
 
(-1.102) (0.065) (-0.853) (-0.225) (2.233) (0.443) 
AUDxIFRS4 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(0.929) (0.293) (0.411) (0.180) (-1.246) (-0.890) 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 
R-squared 0.748 0.747 0.816 0.875 0.831 0.719 
Note: This table reports the results of the 2SLS estimation. In Panels A and C, the percentage of each type of 
financial experts in the insurance industry is used as an instrument for EXPERTS. In Panel B, the percent of 
financial expert directors in the insurance industry is used as an instrument for ACCOUNS ACTS and UWS 
respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses, while ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and10% levels respectively. The significance levels for the independent variables are 2-tail tests. To 
reduce the effects of multicollinearity the component variables of the interaction terms are centered at their 
mean values before being entered in the regression analysis. Coefficient estimates for the INTERCERPT, lagged 
dependent variables, and control variables are suppressed for expositional convenience. In Panel C, IFRS4 is a 
dummy variable equal to 0 for the years 1999-2003 and 1 for the years 2004-2012. Definitions for the other 
variables are given in Table 1. Better financial performance is captured by larger values for MARGIN, ROA and 
ROE, and smaller values for SOL, LR and COR. 
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Figure 1: The Trend of Earnings-Based Performance Measures 
 
Figure 2: The Trend of Solvency-Based and Underwriting Performance Measures 
 
Figure 3: The Trend of Total and Type of Finance Experts  
 
Figure 4: The Trend for % Insurers with Audit Committees 
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